Obama's Contradiction: The Iran-USA Escalation

In May, the Islamic Republic of Iran brokered a deal to transport 1200 kilograms (approximately half) of its enriched Uranium fuel for storage in Turkey--a step to deter ongoing threats of new economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. The agreement, facilitated by President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, requires the Turkish government to provide fuel to power a research reactor in Tehran.

The deal echoes a failed UN-backed deal, which called for Iran's low-enriched uranium to be transported to Russia and France for processing. It has been paralyzed for months--primarily due to Iran's lack of trust that reactor-grade fuel will be returned. The Islamic Republic demanded that the transaction occur on Iranian soil, at the same time. Western powers did not find this a valid request.

Despite the apparent de-escalation of Iran's nuclear aspirations, the United States and other Security Council members are not backing down from sanctions. The Iranian government does not plan to cease it's uranium enrichment, though it has vowed to both the international community and its own citizens that intentions are peaceful and civilian.

As we saw in last summer's botched election and ruthless crackdown on peaceful protestors, however, this theocratic regime is not a particularly honest or reliable authority.

That is not to say an escalation of diplomatic conflict is warranted. Especially if the outcome could be full-fledged war. Indeed, the position of President Barack Obama is highly questionable.

On April 20, the White House sent a letter to President Lula da Silva encouraging the deal, saying: "For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile." The President did not say it would mean the end of proposed sanctions, but stressed that this deal would send a powerful message to the international community, saying "I would urge Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity presented by this offer to 'escrow' its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear fuel is being produced."

Shortly after President Obama's wishes were granted, the sanctions were approved by a unanimous Security Council vote. What does this mean and what are the implications?

The sanctions are intended to target the military leadership of Iran as well as the institutions responsible for uranium enrichment--isolating state-controlled banks from the global financial system and blacklisting petroleum companies. Whether or not the strategy will succeed is unknown. The Bill Clinton sanctions on Iraq brought about the crippling of the Iraqi economy, and is oft-cited as an underlying cause of the mass looting and poverty-induced crime that so destabilized the country post-invasion. The Iran sanctions appear to be more focused on leadership, but there is no telling what effect they might have, or if they will be expanded.

Though the mainstream media will not attempt to analyze the contradictory behavior of the reformer President, it is vital that we ask why he voiced such support for the Turkey-Brazil deal in the first place? Why would this success not be praised? It is a clear improvement from the recent past, but is met with further escalation.

Perhaps it is an issue of American hegemony--that the USA was not a part of the negotiations delegitimizes the agreement for many in the Washington establishment. If other states are able to accomplish diplomatic goals that Americans are not, does this undermine USA's position as the sole super-power? Is peace truly the priority of this escalation?

WTF?? Part 3, Guest Blogger: Hanadi Riyad

I asked a former classmate of mine to write an essay on her views on the the Gaza incursion.  Hanadi is from the region, which makes this situation all the more immediate for her--my hope is that some of this urgency will be conveyed to my readers.

Without further ado, Hanadi Riyad:

"Cast Lead and ME Shift"

As I was thinking of what to write exactly for this short essay, I elected to write from my own personal perspective as based on my daily life and observations as a Middle Easterner. I decided that it is very important for us to realize what a lot of analysts are neglecting to discuss: the reverberating impact of the Israeli invasion of Gaza on the region and the shifts of political roles and landscapes it caused in the Middle East. The on-going blockade aside, the Israeli genocide against the Palestinian people of Gaza, otherwise known as "operation Cast Lead," was a turning point in Middle Eastern politics and public opinion. On the bright side, Palestinians were made to feel less abandoned by the people and citizens of the world. On the dark side, the international community's failure to respond proportionately to the Zionist aggression against Gaza enhanced the Palestinian people's feelings of separation and alienation from the official international system and its ultra-statist institutions. It also widened the gap between the Palestinian and Arab public and their leaders and "representatives."

The numerous public and civil protests against the Israeli aggressions against Gazans first came as a surprise to everybody in the Middle East; they displayed an unfamiliar feeling of human solidarity with the people of the world. In 1948, the Palestinian people were officially abandoned by both the international powers and their people. The feelings of guilt that plagued the people of Europe over the Holocaust presented the perfect chance for the colonial powers to present Zionist Jews with Palestine as compensation. This is the first time since then that the world has witnessed that number of protests against Israel. In France, Spain, the US, Russia, and many other European countries, protestors showed the increasing disenchantment with the Israeli state and its Zionist "cause." I think some of those protests were also driven by the sense of guilt some people, especially Europeans, are feeling over their governments' complicity in the extermination of the Palestinian people and support of the Israeli occupation. The frequent use of the word "holocaust" to describe the latest atrocity against Gaza indicates the people of the world's awareness of the connection between the Holocaust and the Israeli extermination of Palestinians.

However, what did not come as a surprise to anybody in the Middle East was the lack of action on the part of the international powers; some of the blatantly biased and pro-Israeli stances many governments took on the Gaza invasion produced a feeling of repulsion and disgust with those governments. Indeed, the famous and atrocious statement made by the EU presidency spokesperson Potuznik, calling the ground op "defensive," is one example of such a stance. Only either total ignorance of Middle Eastern politics or total inhumanity could have compelled that Czech official to say something as biased as that. I mean, even Olmert and Peres called the op "offensive." What is really significant though is the resulting public disrespect for the UN amongst the Middle Eastern public; this was mainly produced by the Israeli disregard of the UN cease-fire resolution passed on 8 January and its constant targeting of the UN schools where civilians had taken refuge. Not only the sanctity of educational institutions was violated, but also the authority of the UN was dismissed and attacked. There is this conviction now that the UN has backed Israel for too long now that it cannot stand in its face anymore. Only armed resistance is capable of that.  

The gap between the Arab regimes and the Arab public has been there since the artificial states of the Middle East were formed by the colonial powers at the time; now, it's wider than ever. The way that Arab governments split into two camps, the "moderate" or "pro-Israeli" and the "radical" or "pro-Palestinian" was predictable. However, never an embassy of an Arab state was attacked in another Arab country. Egyptian embassies all over the Arab world were attacked vigorously and repeatedly by protesters against the Egyptian refusal to open Rafah crossing into Gaza. While people threw shoes at Egyptians embassies, a lot of Cuban and Turkish embassies were thrown with flowers and roses. For the first time in my life, I heard Arab opposition leaders call, loudly and clearly, for coups and revolutions against various conspiring Arab regimes. Of course, these would be the ones that have the same interest as Israel and the US to terminate the Palestinian resistance and keep their regional hegemony intact, such as Saudi Arabia.

These are only my views and I do not presume to represent neither all Middle Easterners nor the majority's opinion. This is how I see things standing right now in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Israeli ground op in Gaza.

WTF?? Part 2: What is Hamas?

For Part 2 of our series on the Israel/Palestine conflict entitled "WTF??" we will address the question: What is Hamas?

In my research, I have come to fully realize the extent to which American media distorts what Hamas really is. Check out this segment from the Fox News Network:



So let us analyze what how this interview describes the Hamas group. For one, the "expert" who describes to us Hamas and its motivations is a man who works for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies-- a neoconservative think-tank dedicated to "promoting pluralism, defending democratic values, and fighting the ideologies that threaten democracy." This is a very pro-Iraq War group that strongly supports the policies of Israel's ruling party.

Anyways, from the FOX interview, we gather a few assumptions:
1. Hamas is a terrorist organization, dedicated to the "destruction of Israel"
2. It was founded in 1987, and began suicide attacks in the 1990s
3. Hamas has established "major social services program" as a public relations "booster"
4. They were elected democratically-- gaining 62% of the vote
5. Compared to the governments of Hitler, Mao, Mussollini
6. Part of a global terror network-- at the center of which is Iran (and according to the neoconservative dude, nothing fundamental can be done as long as the current Iranian regime is in power... hmm, I wonder what that means??)
7. The caption at the bottom of the screen states: "Hamas wants Israel Gone, Palestinian State in its Place"
8. If Israel leaves without destroying Hamas, it will be seen as a "humiliation"

OKAY, enough of FOX, now I'd like you to see an interview done with Eric Margolis-- author of the book American Raj, a study that seeks to answer why there exists Middle East hostility towards the West (addressing historical, political and religious factors). Margolis was a journalist in the region for many years. Check out the interview, and then we will discuss:



Let's review:
1. Western media distorts what Hamas really is
2. It is a "national liberation movement" ... an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
3. Founded in opposition to the the corrupt and ineffective Palestinian Liberation Organization
4. Israel, in fact, quietly supported Hamas as a means to disrupt Palestinian unity
5. Has Hamas used "terrorist" tactics?
-they HAVE targeted civilians
-they HAVE used suicide bombers
-Why can't we call them "terrorists"?
-Well, the argument is that if Hamas had the same sophisticated weaponry that Israel uses, they would do the same... suicide bombers are the poor man's cruise missile
-But what about the civilians being targets? Margolis says that Hamas is morally wrong in this, and I agree. Civilians should never be the targets!
-But many of these attacks are "revenge" attacks... in retaliation for the attacks on Palestinians

6. The Palestinians have suffered 10-40 times more dead than the Israelis (but this doesn't excuse any attacks on civilians)
7. Hamas is a socio-religious movement, preaching "resistence to Western and Israeli dominance" ... and they remain hardliners against corruption
8. Provides many social services... schools, sewage, street-cleaning, etc... THIS is the MOST IMPORTANT aspect of Hamas.... making them respected and admired by their people
9. The armed resistance wing
-claim to be defending the "rights of 5-7 million displaced, homeless Palestinian refugees"
-won't recognize Israel until Israel recognizes the rights of those 5-7 million

10. Hamas is NOT a "threat" to the "existence of Israel"
-at most, they have 3,000 poorly trained gunmen
-basically, they are totally overpowered by Israeli forces ... they are like 'fish in a barrel'

11. The fearmongering by the Western media and Israeli government has made it nearly impossible for meaningful negotiation
12. Anti-semitism is infecting the Arab world like never before... it is as a result of the Israeli bombings and incursions

**Clearly this issue is more complex and dynamic than one FOX interview may suggest... and don't just take Margolis's word for it. Do some reading on your own and learn the history behind this conflict. What is Hamas? Why does this conflict exist (it hasn't been around forever, you know.)? What is "terrorism"?

Tomorrow evening, a guest blogger will be sharing her very personal views on the situation. Please stay tuned.

Here's a Question: I'd like to hear your thoughts

The terms "enemy" and "evil" are used quite often by government (and citizens) to characterize certain rogue elements and sovereign states.  During World War II, Nazi Germany was our (America's) enemy; the Cold War pitted us against the Soviet Union.  Today the world is a much different place, so perhaps some distinctions ought to be made to better understand it.

Some questions for readers: Who are our enemies today and why?  What is an enemy by today's standards versus those of the past?  Is this terminology the best way to approach

 international relations?  Is there a such thing as good and evil, and if so, what characterizes each?

Give your feedback on the discussion board, and after I get enough points of view, I'll draw some conclusions and post an analysis.

Please contribute (anonymously if you wish)!

The Conclusion: Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003 part 7

For those of you who have been following this paper, thanks! It took a long time and a lot of research. If you'd like to read the whole thing, or to look at my Works Cited, go HERE. Also, I'd like to know how people liked the essay. Was it interesting enough? Did it help broaden your understanding in any way? Give it a rating and a comment if you want! Well here it is... the conclusion:

...With respect to the United States’ position towards Iran and its affairs with Iraq, the situation is quite complex. The neoconservative mission to establish regime change in Iran is certainly coming to odds against the idea that Iran is going to be a prolonged and even vital part of the future of Iraq. It seems as though the neoconservatives did not anticipate that the regime change in Iraq would drastically change the regional situation and make Iran more of a necessary force. Whether or not this fact will put a hold on the agenda is another matter.

It seems that Iran would not have much of a purpose to support insurgency efforts directed at undermining the Iranian-backed Iraqi government, no matter what U.S. officials may say—there is no solid evidence, and it is not a reasonable assumption. It is true that Iranian weapons are being used by people outside the “circle of Iranian and U.S. allies, but that doesn’t prove people’s loyalities. Saying that al-Sadr is loyal to Iran because his militias had some Iranian missiles is equivalent to saying that … [he] is loyal to the Soviet Union because they had some AK-47s.”[41]

But even if the Iranians were supplying weapons to Iraqi insurgents, on what basis does the United States have the right to criticize? The U.S. preemptively invaded a sovereign nation, and is now an occupying force—Noam Chomsky says that in that situation, “you can’t have a serious discussion on whether or not someone else is interfering.”[42] It is a matter of imperial arrogance that drives this policy—the neoconservative belief in a new Middle East that is pro-United States. As a neighboring country, Iran certainly has more at stake in the future stability of the region—and that is a fact that should be respected. Iran will continue to be a vital presence in the future of Iraq, and the United States can either maintain its drumbeat towards another war, or it can turn to Iran for help in re-stabilizing the region that it so disrupted.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 6

Okay, here is part 6 of my paper on the Iran-Iraq-U.S. situation post 2003. This is actually the first half of the conclusion... so only one more part to go! Oh yeah, and if you want to catch up on the previous installment (or just want them available for reference) check'em out: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, and part 5.  Also, if you just want to read the whole thing (plus the Works Cited), go here.

....The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003 marked a new era in the relationship of Iran and Iraq. A once conflicted and even hateful affiliation as a result of territorial disputes, diplomatic breakdown, and aggression, has become something entirely new. Iran is now a key player in the inner-dynamics of Iraqi politics, and is being looked upon as a key stabilizing force. In fact, the stabilization of Iraq is in the best interests of Iran—especially if the resulting Iraqi leadership is friendly to Iran.

Iraqi fears of an overly influential Iran are also at play. Certain secular forces are concerned that an Iranian-style theocracy will be harbored within the walls of Iraqi government, and some Sunnis are also worried that a Shiite “crescent” is being created in the region. Though Iranian influence within Iraqi politics is undeniable, it is worthy to note that Iraqi groups maintain their independence from Iran. Muqtada al-Sadr, for example, said in an interview that he told Ayatollah Khamenei (the Iranian Supreme Leader) “we share the same ideology, but that politically and militarily, I would not be an extension of Iran, and that there were negative things that Iran was doing in Iraq.”[40]

It is important to remember that while Iranians and Iraqis may share ideology, they are still ethnically diverse. From different lineages and with different languages, it is difficult for me to imagine that Iraqis would be willing to be controlled by Iran—there is still a strong sense of nationalism among Iraqis that I believe would prevent an Iranian-based, theocratic government in Iraq. That is not to say that Iran’s influence is irrelevant, because it most certainly is not. As we saw in the Basra situation, Iran holds a considerable amount of sway over the various forces in Iraq.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 5

The next part on my essay dealing with the geo-political aspects of the relationship between Iran, Iraq, and the U.S.A. post 2003 (see the others in the recent archives):

Though much emphasis has been put on some of the more friendly aspects of Iranian-Iraqi relations, there are those Iraqis who oppose Iranian influence. The underlying fear is that Iran will take advantage of Iraq in its weakened state—attempting to instill its own theocratic government. In July 2004, “Iraqi interim Defense Minister Hazem Sha’alan proclaimed that Iran remained his country’s ‘first enemy’, supporting ‘terrorism and bringing enemies into Iraq … Iran interferes in order to kill democracy.’”[34] Sha’alan added that the Iranians “are fighting us because we want to build freedom and democracy, and they want to build an Islamic dictatorship and have turbaned clerics to rule in Iraq.”[35] In addition to this fear, “King Abdullah II of Jordan warned that repercussions of Iran’s influence in Iraq could be felt throughout the region and could lead to a ‘crescent’ of dominant Shiite movements or governments stretching through Iraq and into Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf, altering the traditional balance of power between Shiites and Sunnis and posing new challenges to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.”[36]

Accusations of Iran sending over a million citizens across the border into Iraq in order to vote in the Iraqi elections have also been made. King Abdullah commented, “I’m sure there’s a lot of people, a lot of Iranians in there that will be used as part of the polls to influence the outcome. It is in Iran’s vested interest to have an Islamic Republic of Iraq … and therefore the involvement you’re getting by the Iranians is to achieve a government that is very pro-Iran.”[37] Similar concerns from some of Iraq’s Sunnis have been voiced—accusing Iran of “actively seeking to create a Shiite satellite regime through intelligence operations, financial support and propaganda campaigns.”[38]

Though Iran favors a Shia-led, independent, and democratic Iraq, it would be foolish to ignore their caution to the enormous threat that the United States poses to them. Naser Chaderchi, head of Iraq’s National Democratic Party, said:

The Iranians believe that if there is stability in Iraq, the Americans would consider moving against Iran next. I don’t think the Iranians want to create uncontrollable chaos in Iraq, though. They want a manageable chaos, and they share this approach with other neighboring states.[39]

However, I am curious to know if this viewpoint has changed since Iran has gained considerably more influence within Iraq. If leading elements of the United States government are beginning to suggest that Iran has a crucial role in the stabilization of Iraq, then perhaps the Iranian fear of invasion is moot.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 4

Okay, hopefully you are all caught up.  Here's the next installment of "Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003":

Though it seems as though Petraeus and Crocker want Iran to act as a stabilizing force in the Iraq conflict, their allegations against Iran must not be forgotten. In particular, the accusations that Iran is escalating the violence in Iraq via “special groups,” which are fabricated concepts according to Professor Sabah, who says that they “are a construction.” He explains that the administration is attempting to convey that the Iraqi people are not the ones resisting, but that there are “different … ‘elements’—good and bad … They are trying to faction the Iraqi people into so many different elements that there are no people anymore, and … [therefore] no resistance.”[30]

Since there is a clear antagonism in the rhetoric against Iran (save for the acknowledgements in the peacekeeping role Iran played in Basra), we must take a closer look at what “groups” Iran is supporting versus what groups the U.S. is supporting. Raed Jarrar suggests that U.S. officials are distorting Iran’s role inside Iraq:

The Administration is trying to say that the U.S. is supporting some groups and Iran is supporting some other groups, and these groups are fighting in some type of ‘proxy’ war … this is absolutely not what’s happening in Iraq … What is happening on the ground is that Iran and the United States are supporting the same parties … The Administration is trying … to say that ‘our role in Iraq is exactly the opposite [of] Iran, and therefore, this might justify an attack.[31]

Contrary to governmental claims, “there is no reason why Iran would have any connection to Al Qaeda … [or] ‘special groups’” because of its overwhelming influence throughout Iran (plus, Al Qaeda is a Sunni organization).[32] It seems as though elements within the United States government are deliberately skewing facts and misleading in order to advance an agenda of regime change in Iran. This is, according to Real News analyst Aijaz Ahmad, because of the “pro-Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress that is pressing for that kind of blame on Iran.” Furthermore, in the week leading up to the testimonies, violence escalated dramatically, and instead of letting blame fall on the failure of the surge, the administration is instead blaming Iran—saying that the U.S. troops must stay because of the external threat of Iran.[33]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 3

Here's the next part of my research paper:

The U.S. government, however, is adamant in its position towards Iran—a stance that has recently been called into question due to new developments in the Iran-Iraq relationship. In April 2008, General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. military forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and accused Iran of arming militias within Iraq. Ryan Crocker explained that:

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements, armed and trained by Iran, clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.[20]

These statements bring us back to the previous analysis of Raed Jarrar, which questions the logic that Iran is attempting to sabotage its own parties in Iraq. But we must delve into a much deeper analysis and ask: whom does Iran have influence over and are these parties supported by the United States? We already know that Iranian influence goes deep within the Iraqi government, but it is also prevalent in the Shia militia movements—particular the al-Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr.[21]

In April 2008, about a week before the Senate testimonies of Petraeus and Crocker, Prime Minister al-Maliki engaged the al-Sadrists in Basra, Iraq. This operation was to be a defining moment in post-Saddam Iraq—a turning point in the restructuring of a shattered nation. However, the outcome was anything but spectacular. Al-Maliki’s forces could not fight the Mahdi Army (the Sadrist militia), and actually turned to Iran to ask for help in making a truce between the two groups.[22] Indeed, even General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, much to the dismay of certain neoconservatives, “confirmed that Iran had brokered the peace in Basra … and that Iran wants democracy in Iraq.”[23] Petraus explained that:

Iran … clearly played a role as an arbiter … for talks among all the different parties to that particular action [in Basra] whether that strengthened them or also made them realize that their actions have been destructive … in helping a country they want to succeed … Shia-led democracy…[24]

Ryan Crocker went on to say “One might look for a reconsideration in Tehran as to just where they want to go in Iraq … no country, other than Iraq itself, suffered more under Saddam Hussein than did Iran.”[25] This declaration introduced a surprising element to the U.S.-Iran-Iraq relationship; that is, a split between the military leadership and the neoconservative geopolitical strategy, which “advocates regime change in Iran … not a compromise with Iran over Iraq.”[26]

But are there any underlying reasons for why Petraeus and Crocker were not more aggressive towards Iran? Professor al Nasseri suggests that there are two main interests driving this decision:

In the short term, the United States is interested in securing a security agreement with the Iraqi government because the Iraqi parliament decided last year that there would be no extension of the international troops in Iraq beyond December 2008; so since last August, the United States has been trying to convince the Iraqi executive to sign a long term security agreement … to keep the U.S. troops and bases in Iraq.[27]

The suggestion here is that if the United States is overly aggressive in their policy towards Iran, the legal presence of the occupation could be put in jeopardy. The other driving interest is a long term one, which holds that the U.S. must maintain its military presence on the ground in Iraq because “Iran is the most dangerous place now because they … have affiliation to Al Qaeda, they support these so-called ‘special groups,’ they create a lot of instabilities in Iraq, etc. … The message to the neocons is that Iran is an issue, but not now.”[28] At this point, Petraeus and Crocker are attempting to find common ground between the Republicans and Democrats because they do not know who will be president after 2008, and they “want to create a consensus … between the two parties” and tone down the rhetoric against Iran.[29]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 2

Here is the next part of my research paper on the Iran-Iraq-U.S. relationship post 2003. If you'd like to read it in its entirety (and to dig my sources), check out my knol here.

In December 2004, almost two years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Reuel M. Gerecht[5], a former member of the CIA and resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (a neoconservative think-tank), wrote, “Iran’s primary objective is to ensure that Iraq remains destabilized, incapable of coalescing around a democratically elected government.”[6] He describes a condition of bitterness between the Shia of Iraq and the Shia government of Iran—“The Iraqi Shia retain enormous bitterness towards … Iran’s clerical regime, which did virtually nothing to help their Iraqi ‘brethren.’ He continues by saying that the Iranians are resentful towards the Iraqi Shia “given the damage the [Iran-Iraq] war did to Iran, that Iraq’s army was primarily Shiite, and that Saddam’s elite Sunni Republican Guards were on several occasions near the cracking point. When the Iraqi Shia felt Saddam’s wrath in ’91, there was more than a little schadenfreude on the Persian side.”[7] While there is perhaps legitimacy to many of these claims, Gerecht’s assumption (one that is shared by many in Washington) that “Iran ideally wants to see … strife that can produce an Iraq Hezbollah”[8] does not seem to hold much merit considering the present situation.

Raed Jarrar[9], an Iraqi from the American Foreign Services Committee, explains that the ruling parties in Iraq are directly tied with Iran, and fails to see the logic in an Iranian plot to keep Iraq in chaos. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Iranian supported Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Nouri al-Maliki of the Dawa Party (a party with Iranian origins) came from Iran in 2003.[10] “Why would Iran send special Iranian forces (called Al-Kud’s brigade) into Iraq to attack a regime that is run by their own people?”[11]

Though it is quite unlikely (and illogical to assume) that Iran desires a complete structural breakdown in Iraq, it is clear that Iran has specific goals for Iraq’s future. The International Crisis Group suggests that:

Tehran’s priority is to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat, whether of a
military, political or ideological nature, and whether deriving from its failure
(its collapse into civil war or the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan
with huge implications for Iran’s disaffected Kurdish minority) or success (its
consolidation as an alternative democratic or religious model appealing to
Iran’s disaffected citizens).[12]

To accomplish this, Iran certainly desires a Shia dominated government in Iraq that is friendly to Iran. Professor Sabah al Nasseri[13] from York University suggests that Iran wants a stable, independent, and democratic Iraq, but only as long as its allies (the regime of al-Maliki and al-Hakim) are in power. But if “other political forces—secular forces, or maybe Al Sadr”—become popular and offer a “different kind of democracy,” Iran will oppose it.[14] Direct Iranian intervention is known to have occurred in the January 2005 elections in Iraq, where “Iran had played a significant behind-the-scenes role in assuring the electoral success of the UIA (United Iraqi Alliance—a coalition of mostly Shia groups … in particular, the Dawa party and SCIRI), and had a great deal riding on the UIA’s choice of prime minister.”[15]

In 2005, President Bush made an appearance on Israel’s state-owned news network, and made a comment with regards to a possible military confrontation with Iran over its nuclear aspirations: “As I say, all options are on the table. The use of force is the last option for any president and, you know, we’ve used force in the recent past to secure our country.”[16] Within the Bush administration, there is a commonly held belief that “Iran is the major threat in the region and … simply cannot be allowed to produce nuclear weapons, whether or not it intends to do so.”[17] Iran has declared that it aspires only for “a civil nuclear-power programme,” and denies allegations that it will use these advancements for weaponry.[18] In fact, U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; furthermore, Mohamed El Baradei, Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has stated that there is no nuclear weapons program being pursued by the Iranians.[19]

....I'll post the next part soon.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 1

Here is Part 1 of my study on the complex relationship of Iran, Iraq, and the United States post 2003. There are many misconceptions about the conflict in Iraq and Iran's role in the region (which is portrayed by the U.S. media and government as fanatical and malicious); this paper's intent is to shed some honest light on those issues, as well as to spark some serious discussion. Enjoy!


In 1979, Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, preemptively invaded the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby started one of the “longest and costliest conventional wars of the twentieth century.”[1] The war was in response to “Iranian provocations” and Iraq’s aspirations to “enlarge its role in the Gulf,” and ended in disaster. Fresh out of a revolution, the people of Iran proved to be more of a challenge than Saddam had anticipated, and the Iranians were also incorrect in their assumption that the Shia majority of south Iraq would fight for their cause.[2] There was no true winner and each side suffered massive casualties—with “an estimated 400,000 killed and perhaps 700,000 wounded on both sides.”[3] The Economist perhaps put it best when it described the war as one that “should never have been fought … neither side gained a thing except the saving of its own regime. And neither regime was worth the sacrifice.”[4]

It is now 2008, and the situation between the two nation states has become something quite different—as a result of the United States government’s regime change in 2003, elements within Iraq’s complex political quagmire have established a much more friendly and productive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implications of such a relationship are wide reaching; it is certainly having a direct effect on the geo-political situation within Iraq—playing a key role in diplomatic efforts between various forces in Iraq. It also brings forth a dilemma for the United States and its confrontational policies towards Iran because while they are trying to deal with the Islamic Republic as a nation of “terror”—warning them against developing nuclear technology— they must also recognize the undeniable role that Iran is going to play in the future of Iraq.

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship of Iran and Iraq post 2003, and how this affects the role of the United States in both the future of Iraq and its position towards Iran. What implications is this relationship having on the inner-politics of Iraq, and is there any legitimacy to the U.S. claims (by both the government and the mainstream media) that Iran is backing the insurgency? What kind of Iraq do the Iranians want to see develop in the coming years, and does this goal conflict with that of the United States—if at all?

Stay tuned for more.

SHOWDOWN: Iran

Well, it’s been about 2 months since my last post, and I must say that I have no good excuse for the extended hiatus. I suppose there was a lot of energy and motivation when I decided to found the blog—I had a lot of ideas in my head that I wanted to express. Over time that initial sense of purpose sort of wore off. I took a week off, then a month, and now my break has gotten out of hand. But now I’m back—hopefully this time for good. Today’s topic: SHOWDOWN IRAN.

Today, an official U.S. intelligence report came out that declares Iran’s nuclear weapons program an indefinitely halted operation. In fact, it states that the program was halted way back in 2003. Iran is continuing its process of uranium enrichment, but as of now there is no evident intent to develop a bomb (confirmation of what the mullahs have been saying all along). So when President Bush stated in October that we could be facing the third World War, was he wrong? Apparently not—according to the White House.

National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley states that this report is in fact a confirmation of everything the Administration has been saying. “It confirms that we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons…” So they were right all along, but Hadley doesn't want the American public to jump off the fear-bandwagon quite yet: “the intelligence also tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem.”

What I don’t understand is how this administration claims that it has been right all along. In October of this year, Condoleezza Rice accused Iran of “lying” about its nuclear program; the Vice President has voiced direct and pointed attacks and threats on the government; the President has assured everyone that the nuclear program is, without a doubt, active. Clearly these threats and accusations were either knowingly over-hyped or completely baseless—perhaps a reminder of many of the threats and accusations against Iraq, which were later found to be total fabrications. Perhaps Iran is actually developing nuclear power for the sake of developing the nation. Could it be that the mullahs aren’t lying? Maybe they aren’t the hostile terrorists that we make them out to be.

My fear is another war. The neo-conservative movement has already succeeded in waging one unjust war, and I have no doubt in my mind that they are fully capable to do it again. Our leaders do not seem to understand that the game they are playing involves millions of people. The current war has devastated Iraq—a terrible civil war has broken out, millions are now refugees, and God knows how many Iraqi civilians have been killed (some counts are up to a million). This is worse than reckless foreign policy—this is criminal. This cannot be accepted.

Sources: http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/03/america/cia.php
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21516968/

Ahmadinejad and America's Test

Today President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the Islamic Republic of Iran spoke to students and faculty at Columbia University in New York. His arrival was marked by heavy criticism and fierce protests, but he was nonetheless permitted to speak. Today this country passed a small but important test.

Let me first establish that I believe President Ahmadinejad is a terribly misled man who does not represent a positive force in the global community. He is the leader of a radical theocracy, which maintains brutal rule over its country—though this rule is in fact crumbling due to a very pro-western youth majority (60% of the population is younger than 30). The Islamic Republic is a known supporter of the radical organization known as Hezbollah and has been accused by Washington of supplying heavy weapons to the insurgency in Iraq. Ahmadinejad has been quoted calling for the “destruction of Israel” and has been accused of denying the Holocaust. In his recent talk at Columbia, he went as far as to denying the existence of homosexuals in Iran.

The debate occurring in the past few days has been one that I feel we have truly needed. Ever since the days of Woodrow Wilson, it has been this country’s supposed “duty” to spread freedom and democracy—criticizing and even invading nations in the name of this “freedom.” But now we have been faced with the question: “To what extent do we offer freedom?” Would it be justified for us to tell President Ahmadinejad, who is considered a “terrorist” by many, that he has no right to engage in conversation with America’s youth? I watched the event online, so let me be clear: serious questions were asked—questions that strove to get to the bottom of this terribly complex man. Instead of relying on the media, real students were given the opportunity to directly engage with a world leader who has been the focus of so much uproar. His answers, though ambiguous at many times, brought to light many issues that must be discussed. What caused this radical Islamic regime to come to power in the first place? What was the role of the United States? Why is Israel so hated? Why are we so hated?

Though I am greatly pleased that the President was able to speak, I remain disconcerted over the overwhelming opposition that I have seen in the nation’s leaders, in the citizenry, and in my peers. The “we don’t agree with you, so we won’t hear from you” mentality is what led to 9/11, and not much has changed. Our government interferes with the affairs of others, manipulates nations for our country’s economic interests, it bombs cities, stages coup d’états and assassinations, all to keep our oil prices down. We have made everlasting enemies who attack mercilessly and with brutal strength. Unfortunately, 9/11 didn’t wake us up like it should have. Shame on Hillary Clinton, Mitt Romney, and all of our potential leaders who have denied the significance of learning from this experience—we need a leader willing to engage, not to ignore as we have for so long. To stop the bloodshed we must understand why people hate—and to do this, we must hear the voices of the haters. We don’t have to agree, but we must listen.

I encourage everyone to watch Ahmadinejad speak at Columbia--it is long but worth it.