Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 5

The next part on my essay dealing with the geo-political aspects of the relationship between Iran, Iraq, and the U.S.A. post 2003 (see the others in the recent archives):

Though much emphasis has been put on some of the more friendly aspects of Iranian-Iraqi relations, there are those Iraqis who oppose Iranian influence. The underlying fear is that Iran will take advantage of Iraq in its weakened state—attempting to instill its own theocratic government. In July 2004, “Iraqi interim Defense Minister Hazem Sha’alan proclaimed that Iran remained his country’s ‘first enemy’, supporting ‘terrorism and bringing enemies into Iraq … Iran interferes in order to kill democracy.’”[34] Sha’alan added that the Iranians “are fighting us because we want to build freedom and democracy, and they want to build an Islamic dictatorship and have turbaned clerics to rule in Iraq.”[35] In addition to this fear, “King Abdullah II of Jordan warned that repercussions of Iran’s influence in Iraq could be felt throughout the region and could lead to a ‘crescent’ of dominant Shiite movements or governments stretching through Iraq and into Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf, altering the traditional balance of power between Shiites and Sunnis and posing new challenges to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.”[36]

Accusations of Iran sending over a million citizens across the border into Iraq in order to vote in the Iraqi elections have also been made. King Abdullah commented, “I’m sure there’s a lot of people, a lot of Iranians in there that will be used as part of the polls to influence the outcome. It is in Iran’s vested interest to have an Islamic Republic of Iraq … and therefore the involvement you’re getting by the Iranians is to achieve a government that is very pro-Iran.”[37] Similar concerns from some of Iraq’s Sunnis have been voiced—accusing Iran of “actively seeking to create a Shiite satellite regime through intelligence operations, financial support and propaganda campaigns.”[38]

Though Iran favors a Shia-led, independent, and democratic Iraq, it would be foolish to ignore their caution to the enormous threat that the United States poses to them. Naser Chaderchi, head of Iraq’s National Democratic Party, said:

The Iranians believe that if there is stability in Iraq, the Americans would consider moving against Iran next. I don’t think the Iranians want to create uncontrollable chaos in Iraq, though. They want a manageable chaos, and they share this approach with other neighboring states.[39]

However, I am curious to know if this viewpoint has changed since Iran has gained considerably more influence within Iraq. If leading elements of the United States government are beginning to suggest that Iran has a crucial role in the stabilization of Iraq, then perhaps the Iranian fear of invasion is moot.

You Can't Stop a Movement

I'll be honest, when I heard that John McCain had chosen a woman as his VP nominee, I thought the Obama campaign might be slipping--that the aura surrounding the black nominee would soon be overshadowed by the woman from Alaska.  Will Sarah Palin be able to give the McCain campaign the overhaul it needs to change the face of the general election?  I don't think so.

Palin is an excellent choice, actually.  She will without a doubt in my mind help John McCain; but in Politico's words: "Let's stop pretending this race is as close as national polling suggests."  McCain is trying to defeat a movement, and unless something catastrophic happens to the Obama camp, he won't.  

Pretty soon, the idea that we could have a hockey-mom VP will fade (many believed we'd have a woman as President... and VP isn't as important), and people will remember what they saw in Obama: a new direction.  Whether or not Obama will be the leader this country needs is irrelevant.  The fact is that he inspires people.  He makes you think that things can be better (and they can); that our country can reach for the stars once

again, and that we can be proud of our country without remorse. People don't want the politics of fear--they want to dream, and live the dream.  Perhaps Barack Obama is a fantasy.  Maybe he is an inevitable disappointment.  But it is Obama's politics of hope that make him something John McCain can never be.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 4

Okay, hopefully you are all caught up.  Here's the next installment of "Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003":

Though it seems as though Petraeus and Crocker want Iran to act as a stabilizing force in the Iraq conflict, their allegations against Iran must not be forgotten. In particular, the accusations that Iran is escalating the violence in Iraq via “special groups,” which are fabricated concepts according to Professor Sabah, who says that they “are a construction.” He explains that the administration is attempting to convey that the Iraqi people are not the ones resisting, but that there are “different … ‘elements’—good and bad … They are trying to faction the Iraqi people into so many different elements that there are no people anymore, and … [therefore] no resistance.”[30]

Since there is a clear antagonism in the rhetoric against Iran (save for the acknowledgements in the peacekeeping role Iran played in Basra), we must take a closer look at what “groups” Iran is supporting versus what groups the U.S. is supporting. Raed Jarrar suggests that U.S. officials are distorting Iran’s role inside Iraq:

The Administration is trying to say that the U.S. is supporting some groups and Iran is supporting some other groups, and these groups are fighting in some type of ‘proxy’ war … this is absolutely not what’s happening in Iraq … What is happening on the ground is that Iran and the United States are supporting the same parties … The Administration is trying … to say that ‘our role in Iraq is exactly the opposite [of] Iran, and therefore, this might justify an attack.[31]

Contrary to governmental claims, “there is no reason why Iran would have any connection to Al Qaeda … [or] ‘special groups’” because of its overwhelming influence throughout Iran (plus, Al Qaeda is a Sunni organization).[32] It seems as though elements within the United States government are deliberately skewing facts and misleading in order to advance an agenda of regime change in Iran. This is, according to Real News analyst Aijaz Ahmad, because of the “pro-Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress that is pressing for that kind of blame on Iran.” Furthermore, in the week leading up to the testimonies, violence escalated dramatically, and instead of letting blame fall on the failure of the surge, the administration is instead blaming Iran—saying that the U.S. troops must stay because of the external threat of Iran.[33]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 3

Here's the next part of my research paper:

The U.S. government, however, is adamant in its position towards Iran—a stance that has recently been called into question due to new developments in the Iran-Iraq relationship. In April 2008, General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. military forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and accused Iran of arming militias within Iraq. Ryan Crocker explained that:

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements, armed and trained by Iran, clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.[20]

These statements bring us back to the previous analysis of Raed Jarrar, which questions the logic that Iran is attempting to sabotage its own parties in Iraq. But we must delve into a much deeper analysis and ask: whom does Iran have influence over and are these parties supported by the United States? We already know that Iranian influence goes deep within the Iraqi government, but it is also prevalent in the Shia militia movements—particular the al-Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr.[21]

In April 2008, about a week before the Senate testimonies of Petraeus and Crocker, Prime Minister al-Maliki engaged the al-Sadrists in Basra, Iraq. This operation was to be a defining moment in post-Saddam Iraq—a turning point in the restructuring of a shattered nation. However, the outcome was anything but spectacular. Al-Maliki’s forces could not fight the Mahdi Army (the Sadrist militia), and actually turned to Iran to ask for help in making a truce between the two groups.[22] Indeed, even General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, much to the dismay of certain neoconservatives, “confirmed that Iran had brokered the peace in Basra … and that Iran wants democracy in Iraq.”[23] Petraus explained that:

Iran … clearly played a role as an arbiter … for talks among all the different parties to that particular action [in Basra] whether that strengthened them or also made them realize that their actions have been destructive … in helping a country they want to succeed … Shia-led democracy…[24]

Ryan Crocker went on to say “One might look for a reconsideration in Tehran as to just where they want to go in Iraq … no country, other than Iraq itself, suffered more under Saddam Hussein than did Iran.”[25] This declaration introduced a surprising element to the U.S.-Iran-Iraq relationship; that is, a split between the military leadership and the neoconservative geopolitical strategy, which “advocates regime change in Iran … not a compromise with Iran over Iraq.”[26]

But are there any underlying reasons for why Petraeus and Crocker were not more aggressive towards Iran? Professor al Nasseri suggests that there are two main interests driving this decision:

In the short term, the United States is interested in securing a security agreement with the Iraqi government because the Iraqi parliament decided last year that there would be no extension of the international troops in Iraq beyond December 2008; so since last August, the United States has been trying to convince the Iraqi executive to sign a long term security agreement … to keep the U.S. troops and bases in Iraq.[27]

The suggestion here is that if the United States is overly aggressive in their policy towards Iran, the legal presence of the occupation could be put in jeopardy. The other driving interest is a long term one, which holds that the U.S. must maintain its military presence on the ground in Iraq because “Iran is the most dangerous place now because they … have affiliation to Al Qaeda, they support these so-called ‘special groups,’ they create a lot of instabilities in Iraq, etc. … The message to the neocons is that Iran is an issue, but not now.”[28] At this point, Petraeus and Crocker are attempting to find common ground between the Republicans and Democrats because they do not know who will be president after 2008, and they “want to create a consensus … between the two parties” and tone down the rhetoric against Iran.[29]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 2

Here is the next part of my research paper on the Iran-Iraq-U.S. relationship post 2003. If you'd like to read it in its entirety (and to dig my sources), check out my knol here.

In December 2004, almost two years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Reuel M. Gerecht[5], a former member of the CIA and resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (a neoconservative think-tank), wrote, “Iran’s primary objective is to ensure that Iraq remains destabilized, incapable of coalescing around a democratically elected government.”[6] He describes a condition of bitterness between the Shia of Iraq and the Shia government of Iran—“The Iraqi Shia retain enormous bitterness towards … Iran’s clerical regime, which did virtually nothing to help their Iraqi ‘brethren.’ He continues by saying that the Iranians are resentful towards the Iraqi Shia “given the damage the [Iran-Iraq] war did to Iran, that Iraq’s army was primarily Shiite, and that Saddam’s elite Sunni Republican Guards were on several occasions near the cracking point. When the Iraqi Shia felt Saddam’s wrath in ’91, there was more than a little schadenfreude on the Persian side.”[7] While there is perhaps legitimacy to many of these claims, Gerecht’s assumption (one that is shared by many in Washington) that “Iran ideally wants to see … strife that can produce an Iraq Hezbollah”[8] does not seem to hold much merit considering the present situation.

Raed Jarrar[9], an Iraqi from the American Foreign Services Committee, explains that the ruling parties in Iraq are directly tied with Iran, and fails to see the logic in an Iranian plot to keep Iraq in chaos. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Iranian supported Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Nouri al-Maliki of the Dawa Party (a party with Iranian origins) came from Iran in 2003.[10] “Why would Iran send special Iranian forces (called Al-Kud’s brigade) into Iraq to attack a regime that is run by their own people?”[11]

Though it is quite unlikely (and illogical to assume) that Iran desires a complete structural breakdown in Iraq, it is clear that Iran has specific goals for Iraq’s future. The International Crisis Group suggests that:

Tehran’s priority is to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat, whether of a
military, political or ideological nature, and whether deriving from its failure
(its collapse into civil war or the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan
with huge implications for Iran’s disaffected Kurdish minority) or success (its
consolidation as an alternative democratic or religious model appealing to
Iran’s disaffected citizens).[12]

To accomplish this, Iran certainly desires a Shia dominated government in Iraq that is friendly to Iran. Professor Sabah al Nasseri[13] from York University suggests that Iran wants a stable, independent, and democratic Iraq, but only as long as its allies (the regime of al-Maliki and al-Hakim) are in power. But if “other political forces—secular forces, or maybe Al Sadr”—become popular and offer a “different kind of democracy,” Iran will oppose it.[14] Direct Iranian intervention is known to have occurred in the January 2005 elections in Iraq, where “Iran had played a significant behind-the-scenes role in assuring the electoral success of the UIA (United Iraqi Alliance—a coalition of mostly Shia groups … in particular, the Dawa party and SCIRI), and had a great deal riding on the UIA’s choice of prime minister.”[15]

In 2005, President Bush made an appearance on Israel’s state-owned news network, and made a comment with regards to a possible military confrontation with Iran over its nuclear aspirations: “As I say, all options are on the table. The use of force is the last option for any president and, you know, we’ve used force in the recent past to secure our country.”[16] Within the Bush administration, there is a commonly held belief that “Iran is the major threat in the region and … simply cannot be allowed to produce nuclear weapons, whether or not it intends to do so.”[17] Iran has declared that it aspires only for “a civil nuclear-power programme,” and denies allegations that it will use these advancements for weaponry.[18] In fact, U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; furthermore, Mohamed El Baradei, Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has stated that there is no nuclear weapons program being pursued by the Iranians.[19]

....I'll post the next part soon.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 1

Here is Part 1 of my study on the complex relationship of Iran, Iraq, and the United States post 2003. There are many misconceptions about the conflict in Iraq and Iran's role in the region (which is portrayed by the U.S. media and government as fanatical and malicious); this paper's intent is to shed some honest light on those issues, as well as to spark some serious discussion. Enjoy!


In 1979, Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, preemptively invaded the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby started one of the “longest and costliest conventional wars of the twentieth century.”[1] The war was in response to “Iranian provocations” and Iraq’s aspirations to “enlarge its role in the Gulf,” and ended in disaster. Fresh out of a revolution, the people of Iran proved to be more of a challenge than Saddam had anticipated, and the Iranians were also incorrect in their assumption that the Shia majority of south Iraq would fight for their cause.[2] There was no true winner and each side suffered massive casualties—with “an estimated 400,000 killed and perhaps 700,000 wounded on both sides.”[3] The Economist perhaps put it best when it described the war as one that “should never have been fought … neither side gained a thing except the saving of its own regime. And neither regime was worth the sacrifice.”[4]

It is now 2008, and the situation between the two nation states has become something quite different—as a result of the United States government’s regime change in 2003, elements within Iraq’s complex political quagmire have established a much more friendly and productive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implications of such a relationship are wide reaching; it is certainly having a direct effect on the geo-political situation within Iraq—playing a key role in diplomatic efforts between various forces in Iraq. It also brings forth a dilemma for the United States and its confrontational policies towards Iran because while they are trying to deal with the Islamic Republic as a nation of “terror”—warning them against developing nuclear technology— they must also recognize the undeniable role that Iran is going to play in the future of Iraq.

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship of Iran and Iraq post 2003, and how this affects the role of the United States in both the future of Iraq and its position towards Iran. What implications is this relationship having on the inner-politics of Iraq, and is there any legitimacy to the U.S. claims (by both the government and the mainstream media) that Iran is backing the insurgency? What kind of Iraq do the Iranians want to see develop in the coming years, and does this goal conflict with that of the United States—if at all?

Stay tuned for more.

My Letter to the Chairman of the DNC

Well I just wrote a letter that I plan to send to Governor Howard Dean—Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. The document essentially explains itself, but I encourage anyone interested to read into the matters I go over, and to delve deeper into the unraveling of our democracy. Check it out:


Dear Governor Dean,

I am an 18-year-old freshman at Denison University in Ohio, and have been following the latest presidential campaign very closely. I've had a particular attraction to the messages of both Senator Gravel and Congressman Kucinich—men who, despite their controversial nature, are proven leaders and patriots. By this time you must have learned of the historical acts by Mike Gravel (filibustering the Draft, releasing the Pentagon Papers, the Alaskan pipeline bill, etc), and of Dennis Kucinich's unwavering message of peace that permeates through his legislation in Congress. I am severely alarmed because both of these American leaders have been silenced by corporate media and alienated by their own Democratic Party—this suggests to me that these bodies of mega-power have lost sight of the freedom and democracy that this country is supposed to stand for.

In previous debates, Senator Gravel met the same polling qualifications as other candidates, but did not have enough money to be included. The indication here is that if you are not a millionaire, you cannot have a shot at the presidency. The loyalty oath imposed on Congressman Kucinich by the Texas Democratic Party was a clear violation of the First Amendment—this instance, as well as his exclusion from the latest televised debate on MSNBC have yet to be addressed by you, Governor. Don’t the American people deserve to hear their unique and important views? Where was the voice of Democratic leadership? Where was democracy?

Whether or not these men align with Party doctrine should not be a factor in evaluating them as viable candidates. The American public has the right to hear their messages—to witness them questioning the policies of the leading candidates. For democracy to succeed, there must be a true debate—after watching the last Democratic debate, I can see that this is not happening. When leading candidates seem to agree on almost every major issue, it becomes obvious that something has gone terribly wrong.

For how long can we put on the facade of the “greatest democracy in the world" when our leaders are carefully selected by elitist Wall Street boardrooms and two political parties? This path of corporate censorship and political corruption will only grow worse if left unaddressed. Ultimately it will be up to the people to decide whether or not they wish to survive as a democratic nation, but without the leadership, that will never happen.

It is with great moral conviction and severe urgency that I write this letter. Please consider this cry for help.

Sincerely,
Skye Wallin

If anyone would like to express their own views on this matter, or on any other issue you can send a quick message to the DNC Chair at this link.