Closing the World Markets?!

Berlusconi Says Leaders May Close World's Markets (Update1)
By Steve Scherer

Oct. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said political leaders are discussing the idea of closing the world's financial markets while they ``rewrite the rules of international finance.''

``The idea of suspending the markets for the time it takes to rewrite the rules is being discussed,'' Berlusconi said today after a Cabinet meeting in Naples, Italy. A solution to the financial crisis ``can't just be for one country, or even just for Europe, but global.''

The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell as much 8.1 percent in early trading and pared most of those losses after Berlusconi's remarks. The Dow was down 0.5 percent to 8540.52 at 10:10 in New York.

Group of Seven finance ministers and central bankers are meeting in Washington today, and will stay in town for the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings this weekend. European Union leaders may gather in Paris on Oct. 12, three days before a scheduled summit in Brussels, Berlusconi said today, while Group of Eight leaders may hold a meeting on the crisis ``in coming days,'' he said.

Berlusconi didn't give any details about what kind of rules leaders were looking to change, except to say that leaders are ``talking about a new Bretton Woods.''

The Bretton Woods Agreements were adopted to rebuild the international economic system after World War II in a hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The aim of the agreements was to establish a monetary management system, initially by pegging currencies to gold. The IMF was set up later to help manage the international financial system.

To contact the reporter on this story: Steve Scherer in Rome at scherer@bloomberg.net

The Conclusion: Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003 part 7

For those of you who have been following this paper, thanks! It took a long time and a lot of research. If you'd like to read the whole thing, or to look at my Works Cited, go HERE. Also, I'd like to know how people liked the essay. Was it interesting enough? Did it help broaden your understanding in any way? Give it a rating and a comment if you want! Well here it is... the conclusion:

...With respect to the United States’ position towards Iran and its affairs with Iraq, the situation is quite complex. The neoconservative mission to establish regime change in Iran is certainly coming to odds against the idea that Iran is going to be a prolonged and even vital part of the future of Iraq. It seems as though the neoconservatives did not anticipate that the regime change in Iraq would drastically change the regional situation and make Iran more of a necessary force. Whether or not this fact will put a hold on the agenda is another matter.

It seems that Iran would not have much of a purpose to support insurgency efforts directed at undermining the Iranian-backed Iraqi government, no matter what U.S. officials may say—there is no solid evidence, and it is not a reasonable assumption. It is true that Iranian weapons are being used by people outside the “circle of Iranian and U.S. allies, but that doesn’t prove people’s loyalities. Saying that al-Sadr is loyal to Iran because his militias had some Iranian missiles is equivalent to saying that … [he] is loyal to the Soviet Union because they had some AK-47s.”[41]

But even if the Iranians were supplying weapons to Iraqi insurgents, on what basis does the United States have the right to criticize? The U.S. preemptively invaded a sovereign nation, and is now an occupying force—Noam Chomsky says that in that situation, “you can’t have a serious discussion on whether or not someone else is interfering.”[42] It is a matter of imperial arrogance that drives this policy—the neoconservative belief in a new Middle East that is pro-United States. As a neighboring country, Iran certainly has more at stake in the future stability of the region—and that is a fact that should be respected. Iran will continue to be a vital presence in the future of Iraq, and the United States can either maintain its drumbeat towards another war, or it can turn to Iran for help in re-stabilizing the region that it so disrupted.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 6

Okay, here is part 6 of my paper on the Iran-Iraq-U.S. situation post 2003. This is actually the first half of the conclusion... so only one more part to go! Oh yeah, and if you want to catch up on the previous installment (or just want them available for reference) check'em out: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, and part 5.  Also, if you just want to read the whole thing (plus the Works Cited), go here.

....The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003 marked a new era in the relationship of Iran and Iraq. A once conflicted and even hateful affiliation as a result of territorial disputes, diplomatic breakdown, and aggression, has become something entirely new. Iran is now a key player in the inner-dynamics of Iraqi politics, and is being looked upon as a key stabilizing force. In fact, the stabilization of Iraq is in the best interests of Iran—especially if the resulting Iraqi leadership is friendly to Iran.

Iraqi fears of an overly influential Iran are also at play. Certain secular forces are concerned that an Iranian-style theocracy will be harbored within the walls of Iraqi government, and some Sunnis are also worried that a Shiite “crescent” is being created in the region. Though Iranian influence within Iraqi politics is undeniable, it is worthy to note that Iraqi groups maintain their independence from Iran. Muqtada al-Sadr, for example, said in an interview that he told Ayatollah Khamenei (the Iranian Supreme Leader) “we share the same ideology, but that politically and militarily, I would not be an extension of Iran, and that there were negative things that Iran was doing in Iraq.”[40]

It is important to remember that while Iranians and Iraqis may share ideology, they are still ethnically diverse. From different lineages and with different languages, it is difficult for me to imagine that Iraqis would be willing to be controlled by Iran—there is still a strong sense of nationalism among Iraqis that I believe would prevent an Iranian-based, theocratic government in Iraq. That is not to say that Iran’s influence is irrelevant, because it most certainly is not. As we saw in the Basra situation, Iran holds a considerable amount of sway over the various forces in Iraq.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 5

The next part on my essay dealing with the geo-political aspects of the relationship between Iran, Iraq, and the U.S.A. post 2003 (see the others in the recent archives):

Though much emphasis has been put on some of the more friendly aspects of Iranian-Iraqi relations, there are those Iraqis who oppose Iranian influence. The underlying fear is that Iran will take advantage of Iraq in its weakened state—attempting to instill its own theocratic government. In July 2004, “Iraqi interim Defense Minister Hazem Sha’alan proclaimed that Iran remained his country’s ‘first enemy’, supporting ‘terrorism and bringing enemies into Iraq … Iran interferes in order to kill democracy.’”[34] Sha’alan added that the Iranians “are fighting us because we want to build freedom and democracy, and they want to build an Islamic dictatorship and have turbaned clerics to rule in Iraq.”[35] In addition to this fear, “King Abdullah II of Jordan warned that repercussions of Iran’s influence in Iraq could be felt throughout the region and could lead to a ‘crescent’ of dominant Shiite movements or governments stretching through Iraq and into Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf, altering the traditional balance of power between Shiites and Sunnis and posing new challenges to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.”[36]

Accusations of Iran sending over a million citizens across the border into Iraq in order to vote in the Iraqi elections have also been made. King Abdullah commented, “I’m sure there’s a lot of people, a lot of Iranians in there that will be used as part of the polls to influence the outcome. It is in Iran’s vested interest to have an Islamic Republic of Iraq … and therefore the involvement you’re getting by the Iranians is to achieve a government that is very pro-Iran.”[37] Similar concerns from some of Iraq’s Sunnis have been voiced—accusing Iran of “actively seeking to create a Shiite satellite regime through intelligence operations, financial support and propaganda campaigns.”[38]

Though Iran favors a Shia-led, independent, and democratic Iraq, it would be foolish to ignore their caution to the enormous threat that the United States poses to them. Naser Chaderchi, head of Iraq’s National Democratic Party, said:

The Iranians believe that if there is stability in Iraq, the Americans would consider moving against Iran next. I don’t think the Iranians want to create uncontrollable chaos in Iraq, though. They want a manageable chaos, and they share this approach with other neighboring states.[39]

However, I am curious to know if this viewpoint has changed since Iran has gained considerably more influence within Iraq. If leading elements of the United States government are beginning to suggest that Iran has a crucial role in the stabilization of Iraq, then perhaps the Iranian fear of invasion is moot.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 4

Okay, hopefully you are all caught up.  Here's the next installment of "Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003":

Though it seems as though Petraeus and Crocker want Iran to act as a stabilizing force in the Iraq conflict, their allegations against Iran must not be forgotten. In particular, the accusations that Iran is escalating the violence in Iraq via “special groups,” which are fabricated concepts according to Professor Sabah, who says that they “are a construction.” He explains that the administration is attempting to convey that the Iraqi people are not the ones resisting, but that there are “different … ‘elements’—good and bad … They are trying to faction the Iraqi people into so many different elements that there are no people anymore, and … [therefore] no resistance.”[30]

Since there is a clear antagonism in the rhetoric against Iran (save for the acknowledgements in the peacekeeping role Iran played in Basra), we must take a closer look at what “groups” Iran is supporting versus what groups the U.S. is supporting. Raed Jarrar suggests that U.S. officials are distorting Iran’s role inside Iraq:

The Administration is trying to say that the U.S. is supporting some groups and Iran is supporting some other groups, and these groups are fighting in some type of ‘proxy’ war … this is absolutely not what’s happening in Iraq … What is happening on the ground is that Iran and the United States are supporting the same parties … The Administration is trying … to say that ‘our role in Iraq is exactly the opposite [of] Iran, and therefore, this might justify an attack.[31]

Contrary to governmental claims, “there is no reason why Iran would have any connection to Al Qaeda … [or] ‘special groups’” because of its overwhelming influence throughout Iran (plus, Al Qaeda is a Sunni organization).[32] It seems as though elements within the United States government are deliberately skewing facts and misleading in order to advance an agenda of regime change in Iran. This is, according to Real News analyst Aijaz Ahmad, because of the “pro-Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress that is pressing for that kind of blame on Iran.” Furthermore, in the week leading up to the testimonies, violence escalated dramatically, and instead of letting blame fall on the failure of the surge, the administration is instead blaming Iran—saying that the U.S. troops must stay because of the external threat of Iran.[33]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 3

Here's the next part of my research paper:

The U.S. government, however, is adamant in its position towards Iran—a stance that has recently been called into question due to new developments in the Iran-Iraq relationship. In April 2008, General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. military forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and accused Iran of arming militias within Iraq. Ryan Crocker explained that:

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements, armed and trained by Iran, clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.[20]

These statements bring us back to the previous analysis of Raed Jarrar, which questions the logic that Iran is attempting to sabotage its own parties in Iraq. But we must delve into a much deeper analysis and ask: whom does Iran have influence over and are these parties supported by the United States? We already know that Iranian influence goes deep within the Iraqi government, but it is also prevalent in the Shia militia movements—particular the al-Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr.[21]

In April 2008, about a week before the Senate testimonies of Petraeus and Crocker, Prime Minister al-Maliki engaged the al-Sadrists in Basra, Iraq. This operation was to be a defining moment in post-Saddam Iraq—a turning point in the restructuring of a shattered nation. However, the outcome was anything but spectacular. Al-Maliki’s forces could not fight the Mahdi Army (the Sadrist militia), and actually turned to Iran to ask for help in making a truce between the two groups.[22] Indeed, even General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, much to the dismay of certain neoconservatives, “confirmed that Iran had brokered the peace in Basra … and that Iran wants democracy in Iraq.”[23] Petraus explained that:

Iran … clearly played a role as an arbiter … for talks among all the different parties to that particular action [in Basra] whether that strengthened them or also made them realize that their actions have been destructive … in helping a country they want to succeed … Shia-led democracy…[24]

Ryan Crocker went on to say “One might look for a reconsideration in Tehran as to just where they want to go in Iraq … no country, other than Iraq itself, suffered more under Saddam Hussein than did Iran.”[25] This declaration introduced a surprising element to the U.S.-Iran-Iraq relationship; that is, a split between the military leadership and the neoconservative geopolitical strategy, which “advocates regime change in Iran … not a compromise with Iran over Iraq.”[26]

But are there any underlying reasons for why Petraeus and Crocker were not more aggressive towards Iran? Professor al Nasseri suggests that there are two main interests driving this decision:

In the short term, the United States is interested in securing a security agreement with the Iraqi government because the Iraqi parliament decided last year that there would be no extension of the international troops in Iraq beyond December 2008; so since last August, the United States has been trying to convince the Iraqi executive to sign a long term security agreement … to keep the U.S. troops and bases in Iraq.[27]

The suggestion here is that if the United States is overly aggressive in their policy towards Iran, the legal presence of the occupation could be put in jeopardy. The other driving interest is a long term one, which holds that the U.S. must maintain its military presence on the ground in Iraq because “Iran is the most dangerous place now because they … have affiliation to Al Qaeda, they support these so-called ‘special groups,’ they create a lot of instabilities in Iraq, etc. … The message to the neocons is that Iran is an issue, but not now.”[28] At this point, Petraeus and Crocker are attempting to find common ground between the Republicans and Democrats because they do not know who will be president after 2008, and they “want to create a consensus … between the two parties” and tone down the rhetoric against Iran.[29]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 2

Here is the next part of my research paper on the Iran-Iraq-U.S. relationship post 2003. If you'd like to read it in its entirety (and to dig my sources), check out my knol here.

In December 2004, almost two years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Reuel M. Gerecht[5], a former member of the CIA and resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (a neoconservative think-tank), wrote, “Iran’s primary objective is to ensure that Iraq remains destabilized, incapable of coalescing around a democratically elected government.”[6] He describes a condition of bitterness between the Shia of Iraq and the Shia government of Iran—“The Iraqi Shia retain enormous bitterness towards … Iran’s clerical regime, which did virtually nothing to help their Iraqi ‘brethren.’ He continues by saying that the Iranians are resentful towards the Iraqi Shia “given the damage the [Iran-Iraq] war did to Iran, that Iraq’s army was primarily Shiite, and that Saddam’s elite Sunni Republican Guards were on several occasions near the cracking point. When the Iraqi Shia felt Saddam’s wrath in ’91, there was more than a little schadenfreude on the Persian side.”[7] While there is perhaps legitimacy to many of these claims, Gerecht’s assumption (one that is shared by many in Washington) that “Iran ideally wants to see … strife that can produce an Iraq Hezbollah”[8] does not seem to hold much merit considering the present situation.

Raed Jarrar[9], an Iraqi from the American Foreign Services Committee, explains that the ruling parties in Iraq are directly tied with Iran, and fails to see the logic in an Iranian plot to keep Iraq in chaos. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Iranian supported Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Nouri al-Maliki of the Dawa Party (a party with Iranian origins) came from Iran in 2003.[10] “Why would Iran send special Iranian forces (called Al-Kud’s brigade) into Iraq to attack a regime that is run by their own people?”[11]

Though it is quite unlikely (and illogical to assume) that Iran desires a complete structural breakdown in Iraq, it is clear that Iran has specific goals for Iraq’s future. The International Crisis Group suggests that:

Tehran’s priority is to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat, whether of a
military, political or ideological nature, and whether deriving from its failure
(its collapse into civil war or the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan
with huge implications for Iran’s disaffected Kurdish minority) or success (its
consolidation as an alternative democratic or religious model appealing to
Iran’s disaffected citizens).[12]

To accomplish this, Iran certainly desires a Shia dominated government in Iraq that is friendly to Iran. Professor Sabah al Nasseri[13] from York University suggests that Iran wants a stable, independent, and democratic Iraq, but only as long as its allies (the regime of al-Maliki and al-Hakim) are in power. But if “other political forces—secular forces, or maybe Al Sadr”—become popular and offer a “different kind of democracy,” Iran will oppose it.[14] Direct Iranian intervention is known to have occurred in the January 2005 elections in Iraq, where “Iran had played a significant behind-the-scenes role in assuring the electoral success of the UIA (United Iraqi Alliance—a coalition of mostly Shia groups … in particular, the Dawa party and SCIRI), and had a great deal riding on the UIA’s choice of prime minister.”[15]

In 2005, President Bush made an appearance on Israel’s state-owned news network, and made a comment with regards to a possible military confrontation with Iran over its nuclear aspirations: “As I say, all options are on the table. The use of force is the last option for any president and, you know, we’ve used force in the recent past to secure our country.”[16] Within the Bush administration, there is a commonly held belief that “Iran is the major threat in the region and … simply cannot be allowed to produce nuclear weapons, whether or not it intends to do so.”[17] Iran has declared that it aspires only for “a civil nuclear-power programme,” and denies allegations that it will use these advancements for weaponry.[18] In fact, U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; furthermore, Mohamed El Baradei, Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has stated that there is no nuclear weapons program being pursued by the Iranians.[19]

....I'll post the next part soon.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 1

Here is Part 1 of my study on the complex relationship of Iran, Iraq, and the United States post 2003. There are many misconceptions about the conflict in Iraq and Iran's role in the region (which is portrayed by the U.S. media and government as fanatical and malicious); this paper's intent is to shed some honest light on those issues, as well as to spark some serious discussion. Enjoy!


In 1979, Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, preemptively invaded the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby started one of the “longest and costliest conventional wars of the twentieth century.”[1] The war was in response to “Iranian provocations” and Iraq’s aspirations to “enlarge its role in the Gulf,” and ended in disaster. Fresh out of a revolution, the people of Iran proved to be more of a challenge than Saddam had anticipated, and the Iranians were also incorrect in their assumption that the Shia majority of south Iraq would fight for their cause.[2] There was no true winner and each side suffered massive casualties—with “an estimated 400,000 killed and perhaps 700,000 wounded on both sides.”[3] The Economist perhaps put it best when it described the war as one that “should never have been fought … neither side gained a thing except the saving of its own regime. And neither regime was worth the sacrifice.”[4]

It is now 2008, and the situation between the two nation states has become something quite different—as a result of the United States government’s regime change in 2003, elements within Iraq’s complex political quagmire have established a much more friendly and productive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implications of such a relationship are wide reaching; it is certainly having a direct effect on the geo-political situation within Iraq—playing a key role in diplomatic efforts between various forces in Iraq. It also brings forth a dilemma for the United States and its confrontational policies towards Iran because while they are trying to deal with the Islamic Republic as a nation of “terror”—warning them against developing nuclear technology— they must also recognize the undeniable role that Iran is going to play in the future of Iraq.

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship of Iran and Iraq post 2003, and how this affects the role of the United States in both the future of Iraq and its position towards Iran. What implications is this relationship having on the inner-politics of Iraq, and is there any legitimacy to the U.S. claims (by both the government and the mainstream media) that Iran is backing the insurgency? What kind of Iraq do the Iranians want to see develop in the coming years, and does this goal conflict with that of the United States—if at all?

Stay tuned for more.

Ahmadinejad and America's Test

Today President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the Islamic Republic of Iran spoke to students and faculty at Columbia University in New York. His arrival was marked by heavy criticism and fierce protests, but he was nonetheless permitted to speak. Today this country passed a small but important test.

Let me first establish that I believe President Ahmadinejad is a terribly misled man who does not represent a positive force in the global community. He is the leader of a radical theocracy, which maintains brutal rule over its country—though this rule is in fact crumbling due to a very pro-western youth majority (60% of the population is younger than 30). The Islamic Republic is a known supporter of the radical organization known as Hezbollah and has been accused by Washington of supplying heavy weapons to the insurgency in Iraq. Ahmadinejad has been quoted calling for the “destruction of Israel” and has been accused of denying the Holocaust. In his recent talk at Columbia, he went as far as to denying the existence of homosexuals in Iran.

The debate occurring in the past few days has been one that I feel we have truly needed. Ever since the days of Woodrow Wilson, it has been this country’s supposed “duty” to spread freedom and democracy—criticizing and even invading nations in the name of this “freedom.” But now we have been faced with the question: “To what extent do we offer freedom?” Would it be justified for us to tell President Ahmadinejad, who is considered a “terrorist” by many, that he has no right to engage in conversation with America’s youth? I watched the event online, so let me be clear: serious questions were asked—questions that strove to get to the bottom of this terribly complex man. Instead of relying on the media, real students were given the opportunity to directly engage with a world leader who has been the focus of so much uproar. His answers, though ambiguous at many times, brought to light many issues that must be discussed. What caused this radical Islamic regime to come to power in the first place? What was the role of the United States? Why is Israel so hated? Why are we so hated?

Though I am greatly pleased that the President was able to speak, I remain disconcerted over the overwhelming opposition that I have seen in the nation’s leaders, in the citizenry, and in my peers. The “we don’t agree with you, so we won’t hear from you” mentality is what led to 9/11, and not much has changed. Our government interferes with the affairs of others, manipulates nations for our country’s economic interests, it bombs cities, stages coup d’états and assassinations, all to keep our oil prices down. We have made everlasting enemies who attack mercilessly and with brutal strength. Unfortunately, 9/11 didn’t wake us up like it should have. Shame on Hillary Clinton, Mitt Romney, and all of our potential leaders who have denied the significance of learning from this experience—we need a leader willing to engage, not to ignore as we have for so long. To stop the bloodshed we must understand why people hate—and to do this, we must hear the voices of the haters. We don’t have to agree, but we must listen.

I encourage everyone to watch Ahmadinejad speak at Columbia--it is long but worth it.