You Can't Stop a Movement

I'll be honest, when I heard that John McCain had chosen a woman as his VP nominee, I thought the Obama campaign might be slipping--that the aura surrounding the black nominee would soon be overshadowed by the woman from Alaska.  Will Sarah Palin be able to give the McCain campaign the overhaul it needs to change the face of the general election?  I don't think so.

Palin is an excellent choice, actually.  She will without a doubt in my mind help John McCain; but in Politico's words: "Let's stop pretending this race is as close as national polling suggests."  McCain is trying to defeat a movement, and unless something catastrophic happens to the Obama camp, he won't.  

Pretty soon, the idea that we could have a hockey-mom VP will fade (many believed we'd have a woman as President... and VP isn't as important), and people will remember what they saw in Obama: a new direction.  Whether or not Obama will be the leader this country needs is irrelevant.  The fact is that he inspires people.  He makes you think that things can be better (and they can); that our country can reach for the stars once

again, and that we can be proud of our country without remorse. People don't want the politics of fear--they want to dream, and live the dream.  Perhaps Barack Obama is a fantasy.  Maybe he is an inevitable disappointment.  But it is Obama's politics of hope that make him something John McCain can never be.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 4

Okay, hopefully you are all caught up.  Here's the next installment of "Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003":

Though it seems as though Petraeus and Crocker want Iran to act as a stabilizing force in the Iraq conflict, their allegations against Iran must not be forgotten. In particular, the accusations that Iran is escalating the violence in Iraq via “special groups,” which are fabricated concepts according to Professor Sabah, who says that they “are a construction.” He explains that the administration is attempting to convey that the Iraqi people are not the ones resisting, but that there are “different … ‘elements’—good and bad … They are trying to faction the Iraqi people into so many different elements that there are no people anymore, and … [therefore] no resistance.”[30]

Since there is a clear antagonism in the rhetoric against Iran (save for the acknowledgements in the peacekeeping role Iran played in Basra), we must take a closer look at what “groups” Iran is supporting versus what groups the U.S. is supporting. Raed Jarrar suggests that U.S. officials are distorting Iran’s role inside Iraq:

The Administration is trying to say that the U.S. is supporting some groups and Iran is supporting some other groups, and these groups are fighting in some type of ‘proxy’ war … this is absolutely not what’s happening in Iraq … What is happening on the ground is that Iran and the United States are supporting the same parties … The Administration is trying … to say that ‘our role in Iraq is exactly the opposite [of] Iran, and therefore, this might justify an attack.[31]

Contrary to governmental claims, “there is no reason why Iran would have any connection to Al Qaeda … [or] ‘special groups’” because of its overwhelming influence throughout Iran (plus, Al Qaeda is a Sunni organization).[32] It seems as though elements within the United States government are deliberately skewing facts and misleading in order to advance an agenda of regime change in Iran. This is, according to Real News analyst Aijaz Ahmad, because of the “pro-Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress that is pressing for that kind of blame on Iran.” Furthermore, in the week leading up to the testimonies, violence escalated dramatically, and instead of letting blame fall on the failure of the surge, the administration is instead blaming Iran—saying that the U.S. troops must stay because of the external threat of Iran.[33]

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 3

Here's the next part of my research paper:

The U.S. government, however, is adamant in its position towards Iran—a stance that has recently been called into question due to new developments in the Iran-Iraq relationship. In April 2008, General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. military forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and accused Iran of arming militias within Iraq. Ryan Crocker explained that:

Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish a stable, secure state through the training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements, armed and trained by Iran, clashed with Iraqi government forces in Basra and Baghdad.[20]

These statements bring us back to the previous analysis of Raed Jarrar, which questions the logic that Iran is attempting to sabotage its own parties in Iraq. But we must delve into a much deeper analysis and ask: whom does Iran have influence over and are these parties supported by the United States? We already know that Iranian influence goes deep within the Iraqi government, but it is also prevalent in the Shia militia movements—particular the al-Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr.[21]

In April 2008, about a week before the Senate testimonies of Petraeus and Crocker, Prime Minister al-Maliki engaged the al-Sadrists in Basra, Iraq. This operation was to be a defining moment in post-Saddam Iraq—a turning point in the restructuring of a shattered nation. However, the outcome was anything but spectacular. Al-Maliki’s forces could not fight the Mahdi Army (the Sadrist militia), and actually turned to Iran to ask for help in making a truce between the two groups.[22] Indeed, even General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, much to the dismay of certain neoconservatives, “confirmed that Iran had brokered the peace in Basra … and that Iran wants democracy in Iraq.”[23] Petraus explained that:

Iran … clearly played a role as an arbiter … for talks among all the different parties to that particular action [in Basra] whether that strengthened them or also made them realize that their actions have been destructive … in helping a country they want to succeed … Shia-led democracy…[24]

Ryan Crocker went on to say “One might look for a reconsideration in Tehran as to just where they want to go in Iraq … no country, other than Iraq itself, suffered more under Saddam Hussein than did Iran.”[25] This declaration introduced a surprising element to the U.S.-Iran-Iraq relationship; that is, a split between the military leadership and the neoconservative geopolitical strategy, which “advocates regime change in Iran … not a compromise with Iran over Iraq.”[26]

But are there any underlying reasons for why Petraeus and Crocker were not more aggressive towards Iran? Professor al Nasseri suggests that there are two main interests driving this decision:

In the short term, the United States is interested in securing a security agreement with the Iraqi government because the Iraqi parliament decided last year that there would be no extension of the international troops in Iraq beyond December 2008; so since last August, the United States has been trying to convince the Iraqi executive to sign a long term security agreement … to keep the U.S. troops and bases in Iraq.[27]

The suggestion here is that if the United States is overly aggressive in their policy towards Iran, the legal presence of the occupation could be put in jeopardy. The other driving interest is a long term one, which holds that the U.S. must maintain its military presence on the ground in Iraq because “Iran is the most dangerous place now because they … have affiliation to Al Qaeda, they support these so-called ‘special groups,’ they create a lot of instabilities in Iraq, etc. … The message to the neocons is that Iran is an issue, but not now.”[28] At this point, Petraeus and Crocker are attempting to find common ground between the Republicans and Democrats because they do not know who will be president after 2008, and they “want to create a consensus … between the two parties” and tone down the rhetoric against Iran.[29]