Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 2

Here is the next part of my research paper on the Iran-Iraq-U.S. relationship post 2003. If you'd like to read it in its entirety (and to dig my sources), check out my knol here.

In December 2004, almost two years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Reuel M. Gerecht[5], a former member of the CIA and resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (a neoconservative think-tank), wrote, “Iran’s primary objective is to ensure that Iraq remains destabilized, incapable of coalescing around a democratically elected government.”[6] He describes a condition of bitterness between the Shia of Iraq and the Shia government of Iran—“The Iraqi Shia retain enormous bitterness towards … Iran’s clerical regime, which did virtually nothing to help their Iraqi ‘brethren.’ He continues by saying that the Iranians are resentful towards the Iraqi Shia “given the damage the [Iran-Iraq] war did to Iran, that Iraq’s army was primarily Shiite, and that Saddam’s elite Sunni Republican Guards were on several occasions near the cracking point. When the Iraqi Shia felt Saddam’s wrath in ’91, there was more than a little schadenfreude on the Persian side.”[7] While there is perhaps legitimacy to many of these claims, Gerecht’s assumption (one that is shared by many in Washington) that “Iran ideally wants to see … strife that can produce an Iraq Hezbollah”[8] does not seem to hold much merit considering the present situation.

Raed Jarrar[9], an Iraqi from the American Foreign Services Committee, explains that the ruling parties in Iraq are directly tied with Iran, and fails to see the logic in an Iranian plot to keep Iraq in chaos. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Iranian supported Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Nouri al-Maliki of the Dawa Party (a party with Iranian origins) came from Iran in 2003.[10] “Why would Iran send special Iranian forces (called Al-Kud’s brigade) into Iraq to attack a regime that is run by their own people?”[11]

Though it is quite unlikely (and illogical to assume) that Iran desires a complete structural breakdown in Iraq, it is clear that Iran has specific goals for Iraq’s future. The International Crisis Group suggests that:

Tehran’s priority is to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat, whether of a
military, political or ideological nature, and whether deriving from its failure
(its collapse into civil war or the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan
with huge implications for Iran’s disaffected Kurdish minority) or success (its
consolidation as an alternative democratic or religious model appealing to
Iran’s disaffected citizens).[12]

To accomplish this, Iran certainly desires a Shia dominated government in Iraq that is friendly to Iran. Professor Sabah al Nasseri[13] from York University suggests that Iran wants a stable, independent, and democratic Iraq, but only as long as its allies (the regime of al-Maliki and al-Hakim) are in power. But if “other political forces—secular forces, or maybe Al Sadr”—become popular and offer a “different kind of democracy,” Iran will oppose it.[14] Direct Iranian intervention is known to have occurred in the January 2005 elections in Iraq, where “Iran had played a significant behind-the-scenes role in assuring the electoral success of the UIA (United Iraqi Alliance—a coalition of mostly Shia groups … in particular, the Dawa party and SCIRI), and had a great deal riding on the UIA’s choice of prime minister.”[15]

In 2005, President Bush made an appearance on Israel’s state-owned news network, and made a comment with regards to a possible military confrontation with Iran over its nuclear aspirations: “As I say, all options are on the table. The use of force is the last option for any president and, you know, we’ve used force in the recent past to secure our country.”[16] Within the Bush administration, there is a commonly held belief that “Iran is the major threat in the region and … simply cannot be allowed to produce nuclear weapons, whether or not it intends to do so.”[17] Iran has declared that it aspires only for “a civil nuclear-power programme,” and denies allegations that it will use these advancements for weaponry.[18] In fact, U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; furthermore, Mohamed El Baradei, Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has stated that there is no nuclear weapons program being pursued by the Iranians.[19]

....I'll post the next part soon.

Iran, Iraq, and the United States Post 2003: Part 1

Here is Part 1 of my study on the complex relationship of Iran, Iraq, and the United States post 2003. There are many misconceptions about the conflict in Iraq and Iran's role in the region (which is portrayed by the U.S. media and government as fanatical and malicious); this paper's intent is to shed some honest light on those issues, as well as to spark some serious discussion. Enjoy!


In 1979, Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, preemptively invaded the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby started one of the “longest and costliest conventional wars of the twentieth century.”[1] The war was in response to “Iranian provocations” and Iraq’s aspirations to “enlarge its role in the Gulf,” and ended in disaster. Fresh out of a revolution, the people of Iran proved to be more of a challenge than Saddam had anticipated, and the Iranians were also incorrect in their assumption that the Shia majority of south Iraq would fight for their cause.[2] There was no true winner and each side suffered massive casualties—with “an estimated 400,000 killed and perhaps 700,000 wounded on both sides.”[3] The Economist perhaps put it best when it described the war as one that “should never have been fought … neither side gained a thing except the saving of its own regime. And neither regime was worth the sacrifice.”[4]

It is now 2008, and the situation between the two nation states has become something quite different—as a result of the United States government’s regime change in 2003, elements within Iraq’s complex political quagmire have established a much more friendly and productive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implications of such a relationship are wide reaching; it is certainly having a direct effect on the geo-political situation within Iraq—playing a key role in diplomatic efforts between various forces in Iraq. It also brings forth a dilemma for the United States and its confrontational policies towards Iran because while they are trying to deal with the Islamic Republic as a nation of “terror”—warning them against developing nuclear technology— they must also recognize the undeniable role that Iran is going to play in the future of Iraq.

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship of Iran and Iraq post 2003, and how this affects the role of the United States in both the future of Iraq and its position towards Iran. What implications is this relationship having on the inner-politics of Iraq, and is there any legitimacy to the U.S. claims (by both the government and the mainstream media) that Iran is backing the insurgency? What kind of Iraq do the Iranians want to see develop in the coming years, and does this goal conflict with that of the United States—if at all?

Stay tuned for more.